We present a theory of strategic voting that predicts (1) elections are more likely to be close, and (2) voter turnout is more likely to be high when citizens possess better public information about the composition of the electorate. These findings are disturbing because they suggest that providing more information to potential voters about aggregate political preferences (e.g., through pre-election polls, political stock markets, or expert forecasts) may actually undermine the democratic process. We analyze both small and large elections. We show that if the distribution of preferences is common knowledge, then the unique type-symmetric equilibrium leads to a stark neutrality result in which the probability that either alternative wins the election is 1 2 . We demonstrate that this neutrality result is endemic to large elections. By contrast, when citizens are ignorant about the distribution of preferences, the majority is more likely to win the election and expected voter turnout is lower. Welfare is, therefore, unambiguously higher when citizens possess less information about the distribution of preferences.
In this paper we present a theory of strategic voting that predicts that elections are more likely to be close and voter turnout is more likely to be high when citizens possess better public information about the composition of the electorate. These findings are disturbing because they indicate that providing more information to potential voters about aggregate 1 See http://www.cnn.com/2005/allpolitics/01/12/washington.governor.ap/#contentarea. 2 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/vote2001/hi/english/voting system/newsid 1171000/1171887.stm. political preferences (e.g., through polls, political stock markets, or expert forecasts) may actually undermine the democratic process.
To further motivate this idea, it is worth noting that a simple analysis of the 27 election outcomes since 1900 indicates that the U.S. presidential race has become more closely contested over time as citizens have gained access to new sources of information such as: radio, television, and the Internet. Specifically, let t = 1, 2, . . . , 27 and let y t be the fraction of the popular vote received by the winner in election t, where t = 1 represents the election of 1900 and t = 27 the election of 2004. 3 An ordinary least squares regression of the equation y t = β 0 + β 1 t yields the following estimates: β * 0 = 0.5971 with T-statistic 34.7, and β * 1 = −0.0107 with T-statistic 2.27. 4 Hence, there is support at the 95% level of confidence for the hypothesis that the margin of victory in presidential elections has fallen over the past century. While this is, of course, not a direct test of our model, it does provide intriguing prima facie support for the idea that increased voter access to information over time is associated with closer elections. 5 Our theory is built on a model in which citizens possess private valuations over electoral outcomes and in which voting is costly. 6 Within this framework we explore two informational regimes, one in which the distribution of political preferences is common knowledge (the informed-voter setting) and one in which citizens are symmetrically ignorant about this distribution (the uninformed-voter setting). In each regime we characterize a unique type-symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) in which all citizens randomize between voting for their preferred alternative and abstaining. 7 We further show that this is the only behavior consistent with a symmetric BNE of the voting game when the population of citizens is sufficiently large.
We compare expected equilibrium outcomes across the two informational environments and find stark differences. First, in the informed-voter setting, the probability that either alternative wins the election under the mixed-strategy BNE equals 1 2 regardless of the distribution of political preferences or the cost of voting. This neutrality result stems from the fact that individuals who expect to be in the minority vote with higher probability than those who expect to be in the majority in equilibrium. In other words, individuals who expect to be in the minority suffer less from the free-rider problem. Indeed, their lower expected numbers are offset exactly by their greater expected participation, so that the expected equilibrium number of votes for each alternative is the same regardless of the actual distribution of preferences. 8 In the uninformed-voter setting, however, citizens are not able to base their voting decisions on the distribution of political preferences, since they know only their own types.
In fact, given a symmetric common prior over the parameter governing the distribution of tastes, it follows that all citizens vote with the same probability regardless of type. This equilibrium probability of voting is strictly positive, and the majority group, therefore, wins the election with probability strictly greater than 1 2 . Importantly, it is also possible to show that expected equilibrium voter turnout is lower in the uninformed-voter setting. Hence, the uninformed-voter setting gives rise to elections involving higher expected social benefits and lower expected social costs. In other words, when citizens possess less information about the political landscape, elections are both more democratically efficient (the majority is more likely to win) and more economically efficient (fewer resources are expended in the election).
Since many -if not most -important elections involve a large number of potential voters, it is crucial to know whether the uninformed-voter setting continues to yield higher welfare in the limit as the number of citizens tends to infinity. In this context, it is possible to show that the equilibrium number of votes for each alternative correspond to independent random variables following Poisson distributions with endogenously determined means. 9 Armed with this fact, it is straightforward to verify the asymptotic superiority of the uninformed voter setting. Indeed, our strongest result holds in the limit as the number of citizens 8 The stark nature of this neutrality result arises from the simplifying assumptions underlying our model. A qualitatively similar finding would, however, continue to hold in a less stylized but less transparent setting. 9 This finding is reminiscent of Myerson (1998 Myerson ( , 2000 . There are, however, two important differences. First, the means of the Poisson distributions in our model are determined endogenously. Second, they are finite when voting costs are positive.
tends to infinity and the relative cost of voting approaches zero. In this key situation, the alternative favored by the majority wins the election with probability arbitrarily close to 1 when citizens are uninformed but only with probability 1 2 when they are informed. Our private-values costly-voting model follows in the tradition of the pioneering works by Ledyard (1984) and Rosenthal (1983, 1985) . Ledyard (1984) is primarily concerned with formalizing political competition in a setting with rational voting and endogenously determined political alternatives. 10 Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, 1984 ) focus on the issue of equilibrium voter turnout. In their 1983 paper, Palfrey and Rosenthal consider a costly-voting model with complete information and characterize a large number of equilibria, some of which involve significant voter turnout. In their 1985 paper, however, they consider a modified model in which citizens are privately informed about their cost of voting. This gives rise to a unique equilibrium in which only citizens with costs below an endogenous threshold vote. 11 More recent papers in the private-values costly-voting paradigm include Campbell (1999) and Borgers (2004) . 12 Campbell (1999) studies a model in which members of the minority group possess stronger political preferences (higher values or lower costs) than members of the majority. He presents a limit result that is similar in spirit to our neutrality finding in the informed-voter setting. Specifically, Campbell finds that the minority group wins the election with probability no less than 1 2 when the number of citizens tends to infinity. While Campbell's findings are both intriguing and enlightening, there are some key differences between his analysis and ours. First, our neutrality result holds even in small populations when voting costs are not too small. Second, Campbell is primarily concerned with explaining the disproportionate influence of zealous minority groups on democratic outcomes rather than on the informational issues at the core of our analysis. Hence, Campbell does not consider the impact of public information on electoral outcomes or voter turnout. Borgers (2004) investigates a version of our informed-voter setting in which it is common knowledge that the distribution of political preferences is symmetric (i.e., each citizen is equally likely to prefer either alternative). In this context, Borgers shows that equilib-rium voter turnout maybe excessive, and he argues cogently that compulsory-voting laws, therefore, make little sense. While Borgers' model is elegant and his findings regarding equilibrium expected voter turnout are significant, his analysis differs markedly from ours.
First, because it focuses on symmetrically distributed types, Borgers' model cannot address the electoral bias at the heart of our analysis. Second, Borgers (2004) Finally, Bernhardt, Duggan, and Squintani (2004) investigate a setting complementery to ours in which candidates learn about voter preferences through polls. They find that citizens prefer private polls to public ones because public polls induce the candidates to cluster their platforms around the preferences of the median voter. Hence, the electorate may be better represented when candidates possess less information about voter preferences.
In the next section we set out the model. Sections 3 and 4 contain the analysis of the informed-voter setting and the uninformed-voter setting respectively. In Section 5 we perform welfare comparisons across the two regimes. Section 6 contains an extension investigating the impact of increased uncertainty on the equilibrium in the uninformed-voter setting. We conclude in Section 7 with a brief discussion of three avenues for possible future research. Several technical lemmas and the proofs of all results appear in the Appendix.
The Model
Suppose that there are n ≥ 2 risk-neutral agents who may cast a vote in an election between two alternatives, A and B. Each agent is one of two types, one who prefers A or one who prefers B. A type t agent receives a gross payoff normalized to 1, if alternative t is implemented and 0 otherwise for t = A, B. 13 The cost of voting is c ∈ (0, 1] for all agents. 14 Hence, each agent possesses two (relevant) actions, to abstain or to vote for his preferred alternative. 15 The ex post payoff of a type t agent is given in Table 1 . We compare type-symmetric Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium (BNE) outcomes of the class of voting games just described across two informational settings. In the informed-voter setting, the value of λ t is common knowledge among all agents. In the uninformed-voter setting, all agents possess a non-degenerate common prior over possible values of λ t .
Informed Voters
Let φ t ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that a type-t agent votes (i.e., he abstains with probability 1 − φ t ). A symmetric BNE in this setting is a pair of probabilities (φ A , φ B ) such that it is optimal for a type t agent to vote with probability φ t when all other agents adhere to this strategy. To find such an equilibrium, note that a type t agent compares the expected payoff from voting, U 1
In order to write ∆ t in a more useful form, let the ex ante probability that a type t agent votes be denoted by α t = λ t φ t . Hence, the ex ante probability of abstaining is 1 − α A − α B . Also, recall that the number of ways k A agents can vote for A, k B can vote for B, and n − 1 − k A − k B can abstain is given by the trinomial coefficient
Lemma 1. The net expected utility to a type t agent from voting can be written as
where
and · is the usual operator that rounds a number to the lower integer when necessary.
This lemma has a very intuitive interpretation. It says that the net expected utility to a type t agent from voting is composed of three parts. Specifically, P t (α t , α t , n) is the ex ante probability that his vote is pivotal. The first summation in (2) is the probability that his vote breaks a tie (i.e., the event that k of the other agents vote for each alternative and n − 1 − 2k of them abstain). The second summation is the probability that his vote creates a tie (i.e., the event that k of the other agents vote for alternative t, k + 1 vote for t , and n − 2 − 2k abstain). In each case, the agent's vote raises the probability of winning by A convenient feature of Lemma 1 is that the net expected utility from voting can be expressed entirely in terms of the ex ante probabilities, α A and α B . This derives from the fact that λ A and λ B are common knowledge. In other words, each agent knows the probability that each of the other citizens will vote for alternative t is α t = λ t φ t . This along with the symmetry of the net-expected payoff functions given in (1) imply the following result. 
(b) Both political outcomes are equally likely in equilibrium,
This result is disturbing. It says that in a mixed-strategy symmetric BNE, the probability that either alternative is implemented does not depend on λ t . Hence, the alternative that is preferred by the expected majority wins the election with the same probability as the one that is preferred by the expected minority.
The intuition underlying this result rests on a delicate trade-off between an agent's incentive to win the election and his incentive to free ride on other voters who likely share his preferences. For instance, if λ A > 1 2 , then a type A agent knows that he is most likely a member of the majority and he has a relatively high incentive to free ride (i.e., he votes with lower probability). On the other hand, a type B agent knows that he is most likely a member of the minority and he has a relatively low incentive to free ride (i.e., he votes with higher probability). Remarkably, these effects exactly balance in equilibrium leading to a situation in which the inherently stronger position of a type A agent is completely neutralized. 1718 Since the neutrality result in Proposition 1 presumes that the agents play a symmetric totally mixed-strategy BNE, it is important to determine the conditions under which such an equilibrium exists. Let α denote the ex ante probability that an agent votes for one of 17 Another way of understanding the neutrality result is to note that each agent can vote with a probability up to 1. Hence if, in a symmetric BNE, type B agents, i.e., the minority fall short of probability 1, then they must be "neutralizing" the majority. 18 Partial evidence in favor of our neutrality result comes from the frequent failure of pre-election polls in predicting the election outcomes. For instance, Jowell, Hedges, Lynn, Farrant and Heath (1993) report that in the 1992 British election, while all polls predicted a very close finish, with the Labor Party victory, the Conservatives in fact won with a significant lead of 7.6 percent. Similarly, Durand, Blais and Vachon (2001) record that in the 1998 general elections in Quebec, public polls overwhelmingly predicted an easy victory for the ruling Parti Quebecois, a party dedicated to Quebec sovereignty. Yet, the Quebec Liberal Party ended up winning. Finally, Durand, Blais and Larochelle (2004) note that in the 2002 French presidential elections, although polls consistently predicted a matchup between the incumbent president, Jacques Chirac, and the incumbent prime minister, Lionel Jospin, in the second round, Jean-Marie Le Pen from an extremist right-wing party instead finished second. Interestingly, a common defense by the pollsters has been the weak turnout by the expected majority on the election day.
the two alternatives in a symmetric totally mixed-strategy BNE (when one exists). Since the ex ante probability that he votes at all is 2α, it must be that 0 < α ≤ 1 2 . In order to find a mixed-strategy equilibrium, it is, therefore, necessary to find a solution in this range to the polynomial indifference equation
The function P (α, n) gives the probability that a given agent's vote is pivotal when the other n − 1 agents vote for each alternative with ex ante probability α and abstain with probability 1 − 2α.
Hence, the probability that a given agent's vote is pivotal is lower when all other agents vote with higher ex ante probability. An important implication of this result is that there is at most one solution to the polynomial indifference equation (3). Furthermore, there exists a solution if and only if 1 2 P (0, n) > c and
denote the solution when it exists. Note that existence of α * (c, n) is necessary but not sufficient for existence of a totally mixed-strategy BNE. In particular, existence of a totally mixed-strategy BNE also requires 0 < φ t = α * (c, n)/λ t < 1.
Proposition 2. (Characterization)There exists a unique symmetric mixed-strategy BNE if and only if
and
Condition (4) specifies the range of voting costs for which a solution α * (c, n) ∈ (0, (4) is satisfied, existence of a symmetric totally mixed-strategy BNE also requires that λ t not be too extreme. In particular, if (5) fails, then the agents in the expected minority will be unable to neutralize the expected majority even when voting with probability 1.
As an illustration of Proposition 2, suppose n = 2. In this case α * = 1 − 2c. Hence, a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium exists if and only if c ∈ (
In fact, this example corresponds to the most stringent setting possible, as we demonstrate in Lemma 3 below.
• Large Elections
Given that many key elections involve a relatively large number of potential voters, we now investigate the informed setting for n → ∞. Since we are ultimately interested in social welfare, we characterize not only the election outcome but also the expected turnout in the limit. But, we first record that the region of the parameter space where the totally mixed strategy BNE prevails grows with the size of the electorate.
Lemma 3.
(i) c(n) is decreasing, and converges to 0 as n → ∞.
(ii) α * (c, n) is decreasing in n, and converges to 0 as n → ∞.
Next, we determine the expected turnout in the limit. To do so, let X t be the number of votes for alternative t, and X 0 = n − X A − X B be the number of abstentions. Using this notation, a type t agent's vote is pivotal if and only if X t = X t (his vote creates a tie), or X t = X t + 1 (his vote breaks a tie). Hence, the probability that his vote is pivotal can be written
Now, observe that (
. Although, for a fixed n, the random variables, X A and X B , are clearly correlated, 20 the following lemma shows they are independent in the limit. Let m t = lim n→∞ nα * t (c, n) be the expected equilibrium turnout for type t citizens in the limit. 21 Recall that f (k|µ) =
. . Combining (7) and Lemma 4, it follows that
Moreover, using part (iii) of Lemma 3, eq. (8) 
2 ) = 2c. 20 The correlation coefficient is −nα * 2 (c, n). 21 It can be easily verified that these limits exist and they are finite.
Part (a) of Proposition 3 is a direct implication of Lemma 3, and shows that the neutrality result identified in Proposition 1 is endemic to elections with large populations. In other words, when the distribution of voter preferences is common knowledge, large elections are likely to be close even when the expected fraction of the population preferring one of the alternatives is arbitrarily close to one and the cost of voting is arbitrarily close to zero. As explained in Proposition 1, this disturbing neutrality result is a consequence of the strategic voting behavior that arises when agents have good information about voter preferences. In particular, when informed, agents tailor their voting decisions to reflect the relative size of the group to which they belong.
Part (b) of Proposition 3 points to an additional kind of neutrality result, which is absent in small elections. It says that in large elections, the expected turnouts for both groups are independent of the distribution of voter preferences. 22 That is, two large elections with λ t = 1 2 and λ t = 99 100 result in the same expected turnout for each alternative, even though intuition suggests that the first one should be closer.
Next, we characterize the strategic voting behavior in the uninformed-voter setting.
Uninformed Voters
Consider a setting in which λ t is not common knowledge. Specifically, suppose that before learning their types, the agents' beliefs about λ t correspond to a non-degenerate common prior distribution. For ease of exposition, assume that the prior is symmetric and defined over a finite set of values, λ 1 > λ 2 > · · · > λ r , where r ≥ 2. 23 Symmetry of the prior
2 . Also, after learning their types, agents' updated beliefs are
That is, upon observing their 22 Of course, the equality of turnouts is an artifact of the assumption that the cost of voting is the same for both types of agents. However, it should be clear from (9) that even if costs were different, the limit turnouts would still be independent of the distribution of political preferences, i.e., λt. Moreover, this result is robust to an extension with private cost of voting, where each agent draws his cost from a distribution. For more on this point, see the discussion in the Conclusion and in Taylor and Yildirim (2006) for a formal derivation.
23 Symmetry of the prior is assumed both for simplicity and in order to isolate the role of information as distinct from any ex ante advantage. It is worth emphasizing, however, that the welfare results presented below are conditioned on the realization of λ i ; i.e., we do not assume that actual political preferences are symmetrically distributed.
own types, agents put more weight on being in the majority-a fact that will be useful in developing the intuition below.
As in the informed-voter setting, a symmetric BNE in this context corresponds to a pair of voting probabilities (φ A , φ B ). Moreover, (φ A , φ B ) is a symmetric BNE in totally mixed strategies if and only if it satisfies the indifference conditions
where Part (a) of this result indicates that any symmetric BNE in totally mixed strategies must be strongly symmetric in the sense that all agents vote with the same probability regardless of type. The intuition is straightforward. When the prior is symmetric, an agent who discovers that he is type A learns as much about the environment as an agent who discovers that he is type B. Hence, both types vote with the same probability in equilibrium. This contrasts sharply with part (a) of Proposition 1 where it is shown that agents in the expected minority vote with higher probability than those in the expected majority. This effect is absent in the uninformed-voter setting because no agent expects to be in the minority conditional on learning only his own type. In particular,
2 . Next, consider part (b). Because both types of agents vote with the same probability, it follows that the alternative with the expected majority is strictly more likely to win the election. Again, this contrasts with Proposition 1 where it was shown that each alternative was equally likely to win when λ t was common knowledge.
In order to characterize a symmetric BNE in totally mixed strategies in the uninformedvoter setting, we use φ A = φ B = φ and note that the expected probability of being pivotal in equilibrium is
where we define
Hence, the equilibrium φ * must solve 
Similar to Proposition 2 of the preceding section, this result characterizes the region of the parameter space where the unique symmetric BNE in totally mixed strategies obtains.
Specifically, if c > 1 2 , then no agents vote in equilibrium, and if c < c(n), then they all vote with certainty. 24 In order to facilitate comparison with the informed-voter setting, it is necessary to know how c(n) compares with c(n).
Lemma 5. For any n, c(n) < c(n).
Lemma 5 indicates that if a symmetric BNE in totally mixed strategies obtains in the informed-voter setting, then an analogous BNE obtains in the uninformed-voter setting as well. This is because agents are more likely to follow a mixed strategy when they are in the majority. In the uninformed regime, this is exactly what all agents think after updating their beliefs about λ t based on their own types.
Next, we consider the large election properties of the uninformed regime.
• Large Elections 24 Recall, however, that in the informed-voter setting, if c < c(n), then agents in the minority group vote with certainty, whereas agents in the majority might still mix.
The analysis in this section essentially mimics that presented for the informed regime.
We first note the following intuitive observation regarding the probability of voting.
Lemma 6. φ * (n) strictly decreases in n, and converges to 0, as n → ∞.
That is, the equilibrium probability of voting becomes negligible in large elections. Now, recall that X t and X 0 denote the number of votes for alternative t, and the number of abstentions, respectively. It is clear that (X A , X B , X 0 |n) ∼Multinomial(λ A φ * (n), λ B φ * (n), 1− φ * (n)|n). The following result parallels Lemma 4. We now re-write the pivot probability in (11) in terms of X A and X B . To do so, we first observe that
Hence,
¿From (13), the expected aggregate turnout, M U , is determined by
Proposition 6. In the uninformed regime, for any voting cost c ∈ (0, Part (a) of Proposition 6 indicates that the non-neutrality result identified in Proposition 4 remains valid for large elections. The reason is that while the probability of voting becomes negligible, the aggregate turnout is still significant, and without an electoral bias under the uninformed regime, large elections favor the majority. In fact, as the cost of voting converges to zero, the aggregate turnout grows so large that the majority wins with virtual certainty, which is recorded in part (b). The last part of Proposition 6 simply says that the expected turnout by each type of citizen is proportional to the fraction of that type in the population.
This contrasts with the informed case where the expected turnout is equal across groups regardless of the initial distribution of preferences.
Welfare Comparison
Armed with the equilibrium outcomes of the two informational regimes, we are now ready to investigate their implications for social welfare. The expected social welfare in this context is the difference between the expected social benefit and the expected social cost. Given the payoff structure in Table 1 , and conditional on λ A = λ i , the expected social benefit is B(φ, n|λ A = λ i ) = Pr{A wins|λ i }λ i n + Pr{B wins|1 − λ i }(1 − λ i )n, whereas the expected social cost is C(φ, n|λ A = λ i ) = cλ i φ * A n+c(1−λ i )φ * B n. Hence, the expected social welfare is
From an ex ante point of view however, since the realization of λ A is unknown, we compare the ex ante social benefit, cost and welfare for a given θ, which we write as
The following result lays out a central finding of this paper.
Proposition 7. (Welfare) Suppose (4) and (5) hold so that a symmetric totally-mixed strategy BNE obtains in either informational setting. Then, for all
Part (a) reveals that the expected social cost of voting is strictly greater under the informed regime, which is equivalent to saying that the expected turnout is higher. The intuition behind this result is easily grasped. For any λ t , the expected equilibrium voter turnout is 2α * n in the informed-voter setting and φ * n in the uninformed-voter setting.
To see that 2α * > φ * , consider a situation in which agents vote with the same ex ante probability, 2α = φ, in each setting. In this case, a voter in the informed situation has a higher probability of being pivotal than one in the uninformed situation,
The reason is that when agents have better information, they are better positioned to vote strategically. Specifically, with better information, agents who expect to be in the minority vote with higher probability and agents who expect to be in the majority vote with lower probability. This voter-composition effect leads to a closer election and higher probability of being pivotal in the informed-voter setting when the ex ante probability of voting is the same across regimes. Of course, in equilibrium the probability of being pivotal must equal 2c in both settings. This, however, requires agents to vote with higher ex ante probability in the informed-voter setting, 2α * > φ * .
Part (b) of Proposition 7 says that the ex ante social benefit is strictly higher in the uninformed regime than in the informed one. The expected social benefit is maximized when the alternative that is preferred by the majority group wins. As explained above, this is more likely to be the case with the uninformed regime. In particular, in a large election with a small cost of voting, the majority wins with probability close to 1 under the uninformed regime whereas this probability still remains at An implication of this finding is that the public release of information that resolves all uncertainty about the distribution of voter preferences reduces welfare. The reason for this inefficiency is twofold. First, when the distribution of voter preferences becomes common knowledge, each agent knows exactly whether he belongs to the expected minority or the expected majority group. In this instance, as explained following Proposition 1, each agent tailors his voting strategy to his expected group size so that in equilibrium each group is equally likely to win the election. When no information about the distribution of voter preferences is provided, however, each agent votes with the same equilibrium probability, making the expected majority more likely to win, which is obviously better for expected welfare. Second, as Proposition 7 reveals, the expected total cost of voting is smaller when voters are uninformed. The reason is that when uninformed, all agents put more weight on being in the majority and hence possess less incentive to vote.
Uncertainty and Welfare
To this point we have compared two informational regimes, and showed that the uninformed regime outperforms the informed one in expected social welfare. Under the uninformed regime, agents are ignorant about whether they belong to the majority or minority. Although this uncertainty leads them to vote less vigorously and keep social cost lower than under the informed regime, it also reduces electoral bias and increases the probability that the majority wins. Staying within the uninformed regime, a natural question is then to ask whether greater uncertainty results in higher social welfare. To investigate this issue, we first define the degree of uncertainty via a mean-preserving spread over θ. 
Distribution θ is said to be a mean-preserving spread of θ if there is some
The following result shows that increasing uncertainty about political preferences not only improves the chances of the majority winning the election but also reduces the expected cost of voting by reducing the incentive to turnout. 
The intuition behind part (a) is obvious. When agents are more uncertain about political preferences, they expect that the election is less likely to be close, which, in turn, makes their votes less pivotal, curbing the incentive to turnout. This reduces the expected social cost. Part (b) is, however, less obvious. To see this, recall that the expected social benefit increases if and only if the probability of winning for the majority increases. However, by encouraging fewer citizens to vote, greater uncertainty adversely affects this probability.
What part (b) shows is that the positive direct effect of greater uncertainty outweighs the negative strategic effect. The last part then follows from part (a) and (b).
Conclusion
In this paper we have explored the impact of public information about the composition of the electorate on equilibrium voting behavior. Our theoretical findings demonstrate that providing more information of this kind to potential voters harms the democratic process.
It biases electoral outcomes toward the alternative preferred by the minority and it leads to higher expected aggregate voting costs.
Although we have employed a standard costly voting model where voters possess intrinsic preferences (i.e., private values) over electoral alternatives and a fixed identical cost of voting, the model can be extended in various ways to lend additional realism and provide guidance for policymakers. In what follows, we briefly discuss three possible extensions of the basic model.
• Cost Uncertainty. Our assumption that all agents possess the same cost of voting is clearly a dramatic simplification. We have, however, investigated a more realistic setting where agents' costs are drawn independently from a continuous distribution Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) . 25 Our analysis revealed that all results except for the weak neutrality finding in Proposition 1 remain essentially unchanged. In particular, the strong neutrality result under the informed regime, and the main welfare conclusions continue to hold under cost (or benefit) hetrogeneity. The breakdown of weak neutrality under the informed regime implies that the majority is more likely to win the election when the population is finite, although an under-dog effect still obtains that gives the minority a disproportionate probability of winning.
The intuition is as follows. As noted in Proposition 1 (see also footnotes 7 and 14), weak neutrality requires that voting cost not be so small as to violate the mixed strategy equilibrium. Otherwise, even if the minority agents vote with probability 1, they will be unable to completely neutralize the majority, and thus for small costs, the majority is more likely to win. When costs are drawn from a continuous distribution, the equilibrium must account for all possible cost realizations (including the small ones), implying that the majority wins with probability greater than 1 2 . In a large election, however, only the agents whose costs are close to the lower bound c 0 vote.
In this case, the equilibrium conditions coincide with the setting studied above with voting cost equal to c 0 . Hence, the probability that either side wins is 1/2 independent of λ in this case.
• Common values. It seems plain that in many elections voters are motivated primarily by their fundamental ideologies. Party affiliations and political labels such as Liberal and Conservative obviously connote intrinsic differences in ideological principles. Hence, in elections where ideologies are especially important, the findings presented in this paper regarding the release of public information sound a precautionary note. 26 Nonetheless, it is reasonable to suppose that some fraction of citizens may be non partisans whose objective is to elect the "best" or "most qualified" candidate. It would, therefore, be very interesting to investigate the role of public information in a richer model that allows for both partisan and nonpartisan citizens.
• Endogenous Source of Information. To the extent that opinion polls, political stock markets, and expert forecasts contain real information about voter sentiment, our analysis reveals that their publication may actually impede efficiency, giving rise to closely contested elections with excessive voter turnout. Before firm policy conclusions can be drawn, however, future research must investigate the endogeneity of the source of information about political preferences. In particular, given the feedback we find between information and equilibrium voting behavior, it is important to understand the incentives for individuals to report their true preferences to pollsters and the incentives for pollsters and pundits to disclose publicly and fully any information they obtain. 27
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: First, note that a type t agent's respective expected payoffs from voting and abstaining are given by
Thus,
By substituting these and noting the following facts,
Moreover, given the following two combinatorial identities
where, w.l.o.g., we change index of summations to k.
The expressions in (1) and (2) then follows by simply observing that
Proof of Proposition 1: In a symmetric BNE in totally mixed strategies, we must have ∆ t = 0, or equivalently
for t, t = A, B and t = t . Solving (A-2) for α t , we obtain
To prove part (ii), let α t = α in equilibrium. Note that the probability that alternative A wins given that an odd number k of citizens vote is
Factoring α k out of the summations and canceling like terms in the numerator and denominator yields
If an even number k > 0 of citizens vote, then a tie occurs in the event that j = k 2 of them vote for alternative B, in which case the election is decided by a coin toss. Hence, the probability that alternative A wins is
Finally, if k = 0 citizens vote, then A also wins with probability 1 2 .
Proof of Lemma 2:
We simply differentiate P (α, n) with respect to α
Next, we combine the first summation with the last one and the second summation with the third one,
Proof of Proposition 2: Since, from Lemma 2, P (α, n) is strictly decreasing in
, there is at most one solution to To prove that α * (c, n) is decreasing in n, it suffices to prove P (α, n) is decreasing in n.
By definition,
Before signing this expression, we suppose that n is odd, and re-write the third summation:
Inserting this into (A-4) and canceling terms yield
Given that α * (c, n) is decreasing in n and bounded below by 0, it converges to some α ≥ 0. Suppose α > 0. Since P (α, n) is continuous in α, it follows that lim
We now argue that for α > 0, lim n→∞ P (α , n) = 0. To see this, note that since P (α , n) is decreasing in n, it converges to some h(α ) ≥ 0, and so does its subsequence P (α , n + 1), where, by definition
Since, for a fixed k, lim The last part simply follows from (3).
Proof of Lemma 4: Note that (X
it follows (see Billingsley 1995, Theorem 23.2) that
which is independent of X B . The same argument shows
Hence, the limiting distributions of X A and X B are independent, which further implies 
Since the first and last summations cancel out, we have and
Substituting these equalities into the above expression for
(A-6). Next, combine (A-5) and (A-6) to get
To derive a contradiction to this, suppose w.l.o.g. that φ A > φ B . We show that this implies
¿From (2) we have
Both of the double summations in this expression are negative. To see that the first one is negative, consider the inner summation
Use symmetry of the prior to combine terms 1 and r, 2 and r − 1, and so on, to get
(If r is odd, the expression is still valid in this case since the term involving λ r+1
2 , then each term in this summation is evidently zero. If k < n−1 2 , then each term is negative. To see this, note that 2λ i − 1 < 0 because we are summing over the left half of the distribution. Moreover,
A similar argument shows that the second double summation in the above expression is also negative.
The proof of part (b) closely follows the proof of its counterpart in Proposition 1. Given φ A = φ B = φ from part (a), the probability that alternative A wins when an odd number k of citizens vote is
Factoring φ k out of the summations and cancelling like terms in the numerator and denominator yields
(1 − λ A ) j = 1, the probability that A wins is equal to
which is greater than To evaluate this probability, note that we have
Proof of Lemma 7:
This uses the exact lines in the proof of Lemma 4, except that we replace α A (n) with λ A φ * (n), and α B (n) with λ B φ * (n).
Proof of Proposition 6:
The existence of a unique symmetric BNE follows from Proposition 5, Lemma 5, and the observation that lim n→∞ c(n) = 0 by part (i) of Lemma 3. Now, we prove the remainder of the proposition.
(a) Observe that X A ∼ P oisson(λM U ) and X B ∼ P ossion((1−λ)M U ). Now, for λ A = λ i ,
Pr{A wins|λ
Now, suppose λ i > 1 2 and consider the following sequence of implications where k = j:
The same arguement shows that Pr{A wins|λ i } < Proof of Proposition 7: Suppose (4) and (5) hold so that a symmetric totally-mixed strategy BNE obtains in either informational setting. Each part is proven in turn. (λ i 2 φ, (1 − λ i )2 φ, n) . Then,
Since 2λ i (2(1 − λ i )) < 1, we have
Moreover, since .
¿From the proof of part (a), this means for 1 ≤ j < i 0 , while the first term in (A-12) is positive, the second term is negative. However, a tedious algebra shows that it is overall positive. A similar argument shows that the overall sign is negative for i 0 < j ≤ r+1 2 . Together these two observations prove part (b).
The last part directly follows from part (a) and (b).
